Review of JP 3-07.6 (Second Final Coordination) Dated: 14 April 2000

To: HQDA, ODCSOPS (DAMO-SSP) Attention: 400 Army Pentagon Washington, DC 20310-0400

- 1. Reference JSAP memo, 24 April 2000, Subject: Joint Pub 3-07.6, "JTTP for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance."
- 2. TRADOC review comments are enclosed.
- 3. There are no critical comments. Major, Substantive, and administrative comments are provided.
- 4. TRADOC POC for this review is:

Joint and Army Doctrine Directorate
Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine
HQs, US Army Training and Doctrine Command

Email; DSN 680-FAX DSN 680-

Enclosure

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CRITICAL COMMENTS

None

MAJOR COMMENTS

1. Page IV-5, Lines 31- 33 and lines 41 - 43. Change as follows:

"A difficult but critical task for the supported JFC geographic combatant commander is developing the FHA military mission statement. ... The JFC combatant commander normally coordinates the mission statement with OGA through the IWG. The JFC The subordinate JFC or CJTF should receive his mission statement from the geographic combatant commander. He should"

Rationale: Consistency with Page II-2 lines 3 - 6. The military mission for FHA should be developed at the strategic level. The geographic combatant command, in coordination with CJCS, is the appropriate level to coordinate the mission statement with OGA through the IWG.

2. Page IV-11, line 68. Change as follows:

"The JFC geographic combatant commander should develop military MOEs that support the overall USG FHA mission. They to "

Rationale: FHA military MOE's should be established by the geographic combatant commander and approved by NCA. The IWG process should facilitate the establishment of MOEs that all FHA participants can understand and agree to. These MOEs should form the basis for the military MOEs.

3. Page II-1, lines 33. Change as follows:

"integration of effort is required. Only the combatant commander can direct Service components to provide logistic forces that will be part of a JTF conducting a FHA mission. The"

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Rationale: A subordinate unified or JTF commander does not have directive authority for logistics unless specifically directed so by the combatant commander, and then for common item support only. Clearly, FHA focused JTFs will require significant logistic forces necessary to provide transportation, movement control, medical support, general engineering, etc. We must make it clear in this JTTP that only the combatant commander has the authority to direct Service components to provide common logistic support unless this authority is specifically delegated to a subordinate unified or JTF commander. See JP 0-2, page III-7.

4. Appendix H. Change as follows:

Delete appendix and replace this discussion with a single paragraph on mortuary affairs to the logistics paragraph on page IV-8 with reference to JP 4-07. Replace with an appendix on general engineering.

Rationale: FHA operations are not normally mortuary affairs intensive. Therefore, mortuary affairs does not warrant a separate appendix in the JTTP. General engineering, as stated on page IV-8, will be a major element of FHA operations.

SUBSTANTIVE COMMENTS

1. Page IV-5, line 32. Change as follows:

"...supported <u>JFC combatant commander</u> is developing the FHA."

Rationale: Clarity. The supported combatant commander is the correct level of commander for developing the FHA mission.

2. Page IV-8, line 31. Change as follows:

"...affected country, commercial, coalitionmultinational,"

Rationale: Consistency with JP 3-0 and other recently approved JPs.

3. Executive Summary, Page x. Change as follows:

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"such as a **coalition multinational forces support team** when multinational"

Rationale: Consistency with JP 3-0 and other recently approved JPs.

4. Throughout the JP FC draft. Change as follows:

Eliminate reference to Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs).

Rationale: Consider PVOs as included in the definition of non-government organizations (NGOs).

5. Page I-7, lines 44-45. Change as follows:

"public works and fingering, fire fighting,..."

Rationale: Clarity.

6. Page II-9, Lines 8, 15, and 19. Change as follows:

Line 8: "combatant commander (CINCs) and..."

Line 15: "...Advisors on the CINC's geographic combatant commander's staff"

Line 19: "CINC's geographic combatant commander's political advisor who can provide"

Rationale: Clarity. Although JP 1-02 includes "combatant commander" in the definition of "CINC", the use of "CINC" in this context can be confusing.

7. Page II-10, line 60. Change as follows:

Joint Logistics Operations Readiness Center (JLOCLRC). A JLOC LRC is formed by the geographic combatant commander to provide overall logistic planning and coordination for the command. It may be formed as the primary point of contact for implementing a timely and flexible logistics response for the combatant commander during FHA operations. The JLOC is supported by the Llogistics Rreadiness Coenter and It can

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alert key logistics agencies, locate and procure supplies, move supplies and material to departure airfields and ports of embarkation, and deliver supplies to the required area. Initial relief supplies and equipment willis, in most cases, be airlifted. The JLOC LRC will coordinate supply categories and arrival times with other US and foreign agencies.

Rationale: Consistency and accuracy. Consistent with JP 4-0. Eliminates the confusing mixture of combatant command and subordinate joint force command level logistic responsibilities.

8. Page II-12, line 6. Change as follows:

"combatant commander and JTF level."

Rationale: Consistency.

9. Page II-12. Lines 64 - 67. Change as follows and clarify with respect to "the interagency coordination hierarchy". What is the hierarchy? Additionally, explain why the "the primary impact is at the JTF level."

"Although NGOs, PVOs and IOs may enter the interagency coordination hierarchy throughout its many levels, the primary impact is at the JTF level."

Rationale: Clarity.

10. Page II-12, Line 73. Change as follows:

"various organizations and the joint force commands."

Rationale: Completeness.

11. Page: II-14. Line 29. Change as follows:

"action team, HOC, HACC, civil-military"

Rationale: Completeness.

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12. Page II-15, Lines 25-28. Change as follows:

"... However, members of other agencies should be reminded that the primary mission of the military is deterrence; if deterrence fails, then the military's primary mission is to fight and win the nation's wars Armed Forces' core competence is the ability to apply decisive military power to deter or defeat aggression and achieve our national security objectives. The Armed Forces are organized, trained, equipped, maintained, and deployed primarily to ensure that our Nation is able to defeat aggression against our country and to protect our national interests."

Rationale: Clarity and consistency with the 1997 National Military Strategy statement on the purpose of the Armed Forces (page 5).

13. Page III-1, Lines 45 - 50. Change as follows:

"... In an operational area, aA commander, joint task force (CJTF) could be either an operational or tactical level commander, or both. The JTF mission determines the level is normally assigned a joint operations area (JOA) in the geographic combatant commander's area of responsibility (AOR). THE CJTF operates primarily at the operational level. However, there may be instances requiring the CJTF to focus at the tactical level."

Rationale: Clarity and consistency with other joint publications including JP 0-2, JP 3-0, and JP 5-0.

14. Page II-2, lines 1 - 7. Change as follows:

"legal services, security, engineers, public affairs, health services, psychological operations (PSYOP), CA information operations (IO) including, psychological operations (PSYOP), civil affairs (CA), public affairs, and operations security (OPSEC), resource management and logistics. Additional staff sections cells and centers may also be established to complement and emphasizeare recommended in order to accomplish coordination and control of critical functions. These cells and centers should include an IO cell, civil-military operations center

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(CMOC), joint personnel reception center, joint movement center and others. See JP 5-00.2 and JP 3-13."

Rationale: Clarity and consistency with JP 3-13 and JP 5-00.2. The Information operations cell and CMOC are key JTF staff elements responsible for ensuring that CA, PSYOPS, OPSEC, public affairs and other IO aspects are integrated, coordinated, and support the JTF mission and objectives.

15. Page IV-8, line 37 - 38. Change as follows:

"...FHA operations are logistic <u>intensive and will most likely include significant general engineering requirements."</u>

Rationale: Consistency. IAW JP 4-0, general engineering is a logistic function.

16. Page IV-9, line 12. Change as follows:

"lead agentService or agency for logisticscontracting support. Logisticians"

Rationale: Consistency with JP 4-07 (2d draft). Additionally, the lead Service or agency will not be responsible for "logistics". They will responsible for a specific common item or service support (e.g. Class III, facilities management, contracting support, etc.)

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17. Page IV-10, line 28. Change as follows:

"It is likely that nonmilitary non-DOD USG agencies, HN agencies, and multinational forces will"

Rationale: Completeness

18. Page IV-12, line 40. Change as follows:

"Numerically ReasonableRealistic. MOEs"

Rationale: Clarity.

19. Page IV-13, line 37. Change as follows:

"of FHA operations. (Insert discussion of USAID strategy)
The impact of"

Rationale: Clarity and completeness. The sentence appears incomplete in that it indicates that a "strategy" would follow. However, there is no discussion provided.

20. Page IV-15, line 54. Change as follows:

"will remain a large componenthigh priority for of all"

Rationale: Clarity.

21. Page IV-18, line 53 and Page IV-19, line 3-4. Change as follows:

"The joint force commander ..."

Rationale: Clarity.

22. Page IV-19, line 71. Change as follows:

"Refer to <u>JP 3-13</u>, "<u>Joint Doctrine for Information</u> Operations" and <u>JP 1-073-61</u>, "Doctrine for"

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Rationale: Consistency. JP 3-13 has been approved and published subsequent to this publication. IO includes public affairs (PA). Consequently, PA should be addressed in the context of the IO plan.

23. Page IV-27, line 19. Change as follows:

"area of responsibility (AOR) joint operations area (JOA) to"

Rationale: Correctness. The geographic combatant commander will designate a subset of his AOR for the CJTF or subordinate JFC to conduct operations in. This portion is designated the JOA.

24. Page IV-29, line 1 -9. Change as follows:

"e. Area of ResponsibilityJoint Operations Area. For deliberate planning, a combatant commander's will designate the JTF JOA. It AOR should include its land, sea, and air space. For actual conduct of CM operations If necessary, the NCA may designate, limit, or redefine existing AOR boundaries to accommodate the JOA. The specific operational area for operations JOA will be coordinated with the geographic combatant commander and designated in the CJCS Warning Order."

Rationale: Correctness. The geographic combatant commander will designate a subset of his AOR for the CJTF or subordinate JFC to conduct operations in. This portion is designated the JOA.

25. Page A-5, lines 52 and 53. Change as follows:

"civilian detainees within the operational area JOA. Key considerations for development"

Rationale: Correctness.

26. Page D-4, lines 13 and 16. Change as follows:

"...geographic CINC combatant commander ..."

Rationale: Clarity.

27. Page E-1, line 46. Change as follows:

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"f. If it is a coalition multinational operation, language"

Rationale: Clarity and consistency.

28. Page K-1, line 84 and Page K-5, line 10. Change as follows:

"...displaced dislocated civilians..."

Rationale: Correctness and consistency with page I-5, paragraph 3b.

29. Page K-4, line 79. Change as follows:

"The CINC geographic combatant commander and JTF commander..."

Rationale: Clarity and consistency.

ADMINISTRATIVE COMMENTS

- 1. Page III-9, line 23. Change as follows:
- "...geographic combatant commander's"

Rationale: Completeness.

2. Page IV-27, line 92. Change as follows:

"geographic combatant commander will"

Rationale: Completeness.

3. Page IV-28, line 21. Change as follows:

"commander must be prepared to push"

Rationale: Completeness.

4. Page IV-28, line 33. Change as follows:

"combatant commander's organic"

Rationale: Completeness

5. Page IV-29, line 22. Change as follows:

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"combatant commanders will identify"

Rationale: Completeness

6. Page D-1, line 65. Change as follows:

"a. Peacekeeping and/ Humanitarian AssistanceOASD (PK/HA) coordinates the overall"

Rationale: Completeness

- 7. Page E-1, line 66 80. Change as follows:
- "a. Reporting to the supported commander or organization representative. Present credentials and offer assistance. Be prepared to brief the supported unit or organization regarding the parent unit's mission and situation. b. Establishing contact with each staff section, provide required information, and obtain information that is required to be transmitted back to the parent unit. c. Establishing communication with the parent unit and exchange updated information as the situation dictates.

Rationale: Correctness.

- 8. Page L-3, lines 22 47 and Page L-4, lines 2 and 4. Change as follows:
- d. FM 3-34.114 (FM5-114), "Engineer Operations Short of War," $\frac{13 \text{ July } 199}{2}$.
- e. $\underline{F}M$ $\underline{4-02.42}$ $(\underline{FM}8-42)$, "Medical Operations in a Low Intensity Conflict," $\underline{4}$ December 1990.
- f. $FM_{\underline{1-27.10 (FM}}$ 27-10), "The Law of Land Warfare," $\underline{15}$ July 1976.
- g. FM_{3-53} (FM 33-1), "Psychological Operations," 18 February 1993.
- h. FM $\underline{2-00.21}$ (FM $\underline{34-2-1}$), "Reconnaissance and Surveillance and Intelligence Support to Counterreconnaissance," $\underline{1991}$.
- i. FM 2-33.4 (FM 34-3), "Intelligence Analysis," 15 March 1990.
- j. FM 2-91.1 (FM 34-7), "Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Support to Low Intensity Conflict Operations,"—18 May 1993.

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- k. FM 2-91.2 (FM 34-36), "Special Operations Forces Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations," 30 September 1991.
- 1. M 34-130, "Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield," 8 July 1994.
- \underline{ml} . \underline{FM} $\underline{3-57}$ $(\underline{FM}$ $\underline{41-10}$, "Civil Affairs Operations,"—11 January 1993.
- \underline{nm} . FM $\underline{4-100.6}$ (FM $\underline{63-6}$), "Combat Service Support in Low Intensity Conflict," $\underline{-21}$ January $\underline{1992}$.
- $\underline{\bullet n}$. FM $\underline{3-16}$ (FM $\underline{100-8}$), "Multinational Army Operations (Draft)," $\underline{4}$ April $\underline{1994}$.
- \underline{po} . FM $\underline{4-0}$ (100-10), "Combat Service Support," $\underline{3}$ October 1995.
- \underline{qp} . FM $\underline{3-07.3}$ (100-23), "Peace Operations," $\underline{-30}$ December 1994.

Rationale: Correctness and consistency. US Army field manual publications change title numbers effective 14 June 2000. The old number will be retained in parentheses until the next revision of the FM. Additionally, the date of the publication is deleted for consistency with listings of other joint and Service publications.